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The American people are well known for stressing the role
of individual rights within society. In contrast, emphasis on
community values or "groupism" is widely regarded as a
hallmark of Japanese society. These two contemporary societies
therefore provide an ideal context in which to explore the tense,
yet complementary, relationship between individualism and
communitarianism. This article attempts to deepen our
understanding of the relationship between these two ideas and
the problems that result from overemphasizing one at the
expense of the other.
I n the United States, individualism seems to be
emphasized to the extreme. Ironically, the dark side of
individualism has recently become less visible because of the
quixotic euphoria being experienced in liberal democracies.
This euphoria stems partly from recent political upheavals. The
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union has helped foster an attitude that liberal
democracy, which is based on individualism and is epitomized
by the United States, has triumphed.' However, this attitude

1. The talk of "the end of history," which Francis Fukuyama has recently
END
popularized, is a striking example of this attitude. FRANCIS FUKWAMA,
OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xi (1992). Fukuyama argues "that liberal
democracy may constitute 'the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution' and 'the
final ,form of human government' and as such constituted the 'end of history.' " Id.
(quoting Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? 16 NAT'L INTEREST, Summer
1969, at 3). He believes so because "while earlier forms of government were
characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse,
liberal democracy was arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions."
Id. But he seems to recoil from, or even reject, this bold stance near the end of
his book when he says:
Liberal democracies, in other words, are not self-sufficient: the
community life on which they depend must ultimately come from a source
different h m liberalism itself. The men and women who made up
American society at the time of founding of the United States were not
isolated, rational individuals calculating their self-interest. Rather, they
were for the most part members of religious communities held together by
a common moral code and belief in God. . . . But in the long run those
liberal principles had a corrosive effect on the values predating liberalism
necessary to sustain strong communities, and thereby on a liberal
society's ability to be self-sustaining.
Id. at 326-27 (citations omitted). Here Fukuyama echoes the communitarian
critique of liberalism which is discussed in the text. See infra part 11. Therefore,
his standpoint seems to be more elusive than provocative.
'
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does not reflect s o much a firm self-conviction that liberal
democracy truly has "triumphed," as it does an underlying need
for psychological compensation for the anxiety and frustration
that liberal democracy has produced.
Since the 1970s, the American people have become
painfully aware of the chronic diseases in their society such as
crime, moral and social decay and inner-city collapse. Many
serious thinkers have attributed these problems to the inherent
defects or contradictions of liberalism in its existing form2 In
the arena of political and legal philosophy, a significant body of
these critics espouse increased c~mmunitarianism.~
These
communitarians believe liberalism, both in its libertarian
version--committed to the free market system-and in its
egalitarian version-committed to the welfare state and its
accompanying bureaucracy-is responsible for the erosion of
families, local communities and other forms of primary human
associations that traditionally have served as buffers between
individuals and the state. The communitarians argue that such
community and local associations are indispensable for the
cultivation of moral and social responsibility. Critics of modern
liberal democracy a r e calling for a shift towards
communitarianism; they are calling for more community in the
'land of right^."^
Alan Ryan criticizes Fukuyama for his incoherent understanding of liberal
democracies shown in another context, saying that "he does not know what he
really believes." Alan Ryan, Professor Hegel Goes to Washington, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Mar. 26, 1992, at 7-8. But the truth may be that Fukuyama does not really
believe what he claims to know. At any rate, his evasiveness exemplifies the fact
that the current "triumphalism" of liberal democracy is not based on a firm selfconviction.
OF CAPITALISM21See, e.g., DANIELBELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS
2.
22, 54-55, 78-84, 171, 256-58 (1976). Bell, however, believes that it is possible to
rescue liberalism from the cultural contradictions of capitalism by separating
political liberalism from economic liberalism and combining the former with the
idea of the public household. Id. at 277-82. Like Bell, a number of intellectuals
with liberal sympathies are themselves aware of the crisis of liberalism and the
need for its philosophical reconstruction. See, e.g., LIBERALSON LIBERALISM15-64
ANOTHER LIBERALISM:
(Alfonso J. Damico ed., 1986); NANCYL. ROSENBLUM,
ROMANTICISM
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF LIBERAL
THOUGHT(1987).
3.
For the gist of the polemics and bibliographical information, see
COMMUNITARIANISM
AND INDMDUALISM
(Shlomo Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds.
1992); LAW AND THE COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? (A.C. Hutchinson &
L.J.M. Green eds., 1989); LIBERALISM
AND ITS CRITICS(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984)
[hereinafter LIBERALISM];LIBERALISMAND THE MORALLIFE (Nancy L. Rosenblum
ed., 1989); STEPHEN MULHALL
& ADAM SWIET, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS
(1992).
4.
As far as I know, the first person to use the phrase Yand of rights" is
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I n Japan, the opposite problem exists-a hypertechnical
communitarianism has exacted a heavy toll on the people,
while it has contributed to the postwar resurgence and success
of the country. This article will explore some glaring aspects of
this dilemma of communitarianism. Particular attention will be
drawn to kaishashugi, which is a communitarian reconstruction
of capitalism prevalent in Japan. It exemplifies how the
communal identity can enhance people's productivity and yet
impovefish their lives. A devastating side effect of its
prevalence is karoshi, meaning literally death from overwork,
which deftly symbolizes the dilemma inherent in Japan's
emphasis on communitarianism. The lesson learned from these
and other related phenomena is that Japan must seek a more
balanced approach in accommodating the tension between
communitarianism and individualism. In other words, there is
a great need for more emphasis on individual rights in what
might be referred to as the land of community.
This article discusses how Japanese society can benefit by
placing a stronger emphasis on individual rights and how the
Japanese experience can shed light on issues raised by the
current liberal-communitarian debate. In order to set the
Japanese dilemma in vivid relief against the background of this
debate, part I1 begins by briefly surveying the current
intellectual movement in the United States called communitarianism. The thrust of part I1 is to illustrate several theories
that try to reconstruct the American Society so that it will
foster greater community values and thereby avoid the dangers
of excessive individualism. With this understanding of the
communitarian movement, p a r t I11 describes t h e
communitarian character of contemporary Japanese society by
looking at kaishashugi, a unique feature of communality in
modern Japan. Part I11 also discusses a troubling problem
caused by the dark side of communitarianism-karoshi.
Discussing kroshi and other examples of the tyranny of
intermediary communities in Japan, part I11 argues that Japan
needs to reorient5 its society so as to take individual rights
more seriously. Finally, by reconsidering the relationship
between individual rights and the multiplicity of our communal
responsibilities, part IV argues that such a reorientation would
Mary AM Glendon. See MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTSTALK:THE IMPOVERISHMENT
OF
POLITICAT.DISCOURSE
1 (1991).

5.

No pun intended.
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enrich Japan's communal life because an adequate form of
individualism is an indispensable basis for open communality.

The United States is a land of individuality and individual
rights. Individual liberties and freedoms have become the overarching concern of the American legal system. Communitarians
are now objecting that America has become so polarized on
individualism as to be crippled by social ills. While the focus of
this paper is not on America's social ills, some brief remarks
are appropriate on the current comrnunitarian movement in
the United States and how it argues for increased community
in this land of rights.

A. Four Current Viewpoints of Communitarianism
Communitarians are all motivated by the practical need
they see to rehabilitate or strengthen community-based moral
and social values. But their theories involve differences in focus, of course, and as a whole constitute more of a n intellectual
alliance with family resemblances rather than a unitary ideology. Thus, it is difficult to formulate t h e ideas of
communitariarism in any systematic way. Generally speaking,
however, communitarians share all or some of the following
four viewpoints.
1. Conventionalist meta-ethics

One viewpoint of communitarianism may be referred to as
conventionalist meta-ethics. The central thesis of this theory is
that moral and political values are the conventions or common
understandings developed through the particular history and
traditions of a given political community. There are no independent external grounds from which to criticize a community's
practices. Political communities are only capable of internal or
connected criticism based on their own traditions. Thus, the
principles of human rights to which liberals are committed
cannot claim universal validity. Moreover, these principles are
too abstract to give effective and substantial guidance regarding the problems of political m ~ r a l i t y . ~
6. See generally ALA~DAIRWCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY 126-27,221-23,268-69,272-78 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinaibr W I N T Y R E , AFTER VIRTUE]; ALASDAIR MACINTIRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONAL~~Y?7-11,
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2. Anti-atomist anthropology
Communitarians characterize liberalism as atomistic in its
conception of human self and agency. In other words, liberals
are said to assume that an individual's self-identity is constituted by her ability to choose her ends, not by any of the ends
and values shared in the community t o which she belongs. The
second viewpoint of communitarianism, which I call anti-atomist anthropology, asserts that this atomistic conception of humans is false.
Anti-atomist anthropology holds that humans are social
animals, not separate atomistic beings completely independent
of one another. Moreover, individuals who are unencumbered
by community values are far from autonomous because they
lack any deeply internalized values necessary to make reflective choices. The moral depth and rich self-knowledge that
empower human agency can only be enjoyed by the situated
selves whose identity is partially constituted by shared ends
embedded in the common history or narratives of their commu-

3. Politics of the common good

A third communitarian viewpoint stresses that politics
should promote the common good. The aim of politics and law
is to promote the community's pursuit of its common conception
of the good life, rather than to protect individuals' rights to
form and live by their own conceptions. Politics and law can
and should endeavor to make people virtuous as defined by this
common conception. It is not enough to assure that people are
fair or just in the sense that they refrain from violating other
people's rights. The key tenets of deontological liberalism-the
primacy of justice over the good and the concept of individual
rights as trumps or side-constraints over collective goals-must
389-403 (1988) [hereinafkr MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE?]; MICHAELWALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM
(1987) [hereinaRer WALZER,INTERPRETATION];
WALZER,SPHERES OF JUSTICE:A DEFENSEOF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY
MICHAEL
xiv-w, 312-16 (1983) [hereinafter WALZER,
SPHERESOF JUSTICE];Charles Taylor,

The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice, in 2 PHIL.
PAPERS289-303 (1985).
7.
MACINTYRE,
AFPER VIRTUE,supra note 6, at 216-21; MICHAELJ. SANDEL,
AND THE LIMITSOF JUSTICE15-65, 147-83 (1982); Charles Taylor, AtLIBERALISM
omism, in COMMUNITARIANISM
AND INDIVIDUALISM,supra note 3, at 29; CHARLES
TAYLOR,
HEGELAND MODERNSOCIETY 154-66 (1979) [hereinafter TAYLOR,MODERN
SOCIETY].
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be rejected so that the community can use its regulating power
to restrict individual rights in favor of collective goals and, if
necessary, t o interfere with the morality of indi~iduals.~
4. Civic republicanism

A fourth viewpoint of communitarianism is the need for
society to strengthen its adherence to civic republicanism. Civic
republicanism stands for the idea that society must develop
civic virtue in order to advance the common good. Civic virtue
consists of the individual's ability and willingness to actively
participate in the public affairs of his own community. Liberals
favor a centralized representative government constrained by
judicial review, but this system has protected the private interests and negative liberty of individuals a t the cost of spreading
political apathy and public irresponsibility. What is needed to
cultivate or rehabilitate civic virtue is to revitalize the selfruling practices of local communities and other intermediary
institutions which can function as the primary schools of participatory demo~racy.~
B. Attempts to Strengthen the Communitarian
Movement in America
The four viewpoints summarized above are closely interrelated, but no logically necessary connections exist between
them. In fact, a potential tension exists between the conservative, tradition-based tenets of the first and second viewpoints
on the one hand, and the theme of radical participatory democracy underlying the fourth viewpoint on the other. For exam-

8. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 6, a t 244-55;SANDEL,supra note 7,
at 179-83;LIBERALISM,
supra note 3, a t 6-7;Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument
and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and H o m o s d i t y , 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 521-38
(1989); Michael J. Sandel, Morality and the Liberal Ideal, NEW REPUBLIC,May 7,
1984, a t 17.
9. See generally BENJAMINR. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); ROBERTN. BELLAHET AL., HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISMAND COMMITMENT
IN AMERICANLIFE(1985); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:nORENTINE POLITICAL
THOUGHTAND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN
TRADITION
(1975);Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the
Unencumbered Self, in COMMUNITARIANISM
AND INDIVIDUALISM,
supra note 3, a t 2428; Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 3, at 159-82;Charles Taylor, Rant's w r y
of Freedom, in 2 PHIL. PAPERS,supra note 6, a t 318-37.For discussions on civic
republicanism, see Civic Republicanism and Its Critics, 14 POL. THEORY423-93
(1986).
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ple, one commentator has discussed this potential conflict by
juxtaposing the traditionalist version of communitarianism,
which he calls unitary democracy, with a radical participatory
democracy, which he calls strong democracy.1° While the former regards community consensus as a preexistent collective
entity, the latter places great emphasis on creating a community consensus through a transformative participatory process.
One way to relax this tension is to regard the quest for
civic virtue itself as a fundamental value inherent in the
shared tradition. Such a formulation essentially equates with a
republican reinterpretation of American constitutional history.'' The tension may also be relaxed by holding that participatory democracy requires some shared traditions as the common ground for consensus formation to restrain its own disintegrative tendency.12
One can discern, however, a common theme underlying the
four viewpoints of communitarianism. This common theme may
be described as a n attempt to shift the community's focus from
abstract individual rights to the concrete common good. It is a
movement away from disempowered autonomy of rootless individuals and toward a common flourishing of human agency
realized in a community where people share memories and
jointly venture to shape their common futures in their own
way.
A parallel intellectual movement can be seen in developmental psychology. The dominant model of human moral development constructed on the Piaget-Kohlberg lines regards individual autonomy and universalism of equal rights as the acme
of moral maturity.13 Criticizing this model, Carol Gilligan
presents an alternative model in a context specifically aimed at
women, but applicable to society at large.14 She believes that
her model can illuminate the complexity and richness of those
10.
BARBER,supra note 9, at 148-62, 242-51. See also Barber's criticism of
MacIntyre in BENJAMINR. BARBER,TIIE CONQUESTOF POLITICS:LIBERALPHILOSOPHY IN DEMOCRATIC
TIMES177-92 (1988).
11. See genemUy BERNARD
BAILYN,T m IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINSOF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
(1967); POCOCK, supra note 9; GORDONS. WOOD,rn CREATIONOF
THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC1776-1787 (1969). For recent discussions on the subject,
see Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALEL.J. 1493-723 (1988).
12.
SOCIETY,supra note 7, at 115.
T A ~ RMODERN
,
13. See generally LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORALDEVELOPMENT (1981); JEANPIAGET,T'Hli! MORAL JUDGMENT
OF A CHILD (1932).
14.
CAROL GILLIGAN,
IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORYAND
WOMEN'SDEVELOPMENT (1982).
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dimensions of women's moral experiences which she thinks the
dominant model has distorted as a sign of women's moral immaturity.
Gilligan presents a conception of morality that she calls
"an ethic of care," in contrast to "an ethic of rights," which she
characterizes as the dominant model.15 An ethic of care accepts interdependence, connection and attachment a s the primary human conditions; a n ethic of rights assumes that independence, separation and self-sufficiency are the basic conditions for individual security and self-fulfillment.16
Other important differences derive from this fundamental
difference between the two conceptions of morality. For example, the cardinal value in a n ethic of care is the responsibility
of caring, or sensitivity and responsiveness to concrete human
needs, which enables us to strengthen human relationships. In
contrast, an ethic of rights gives primacy to the universal principles of justice, which require us to respect the equal rights of
all individuals and to balance those rights in a fair and impersonal way.''
Consequently, a n ethic of care considers conflicting responsibilities to be the most pressing moral dilemma, requiring for
its resolution a contextual and narrative mode of moral deliberation-a mode of thinking sensitive to the contingencies and
contextual particularity of each conflict situation.18 An ethic of
rights, on the other hand, interprets moral problems as a conflict of rights, and requires us to solve them by a formal, abstract mode of thinking which "divest[s] moral actors from the
history and psychology of their individual lives and separate[sl
the moral problem from the social contingencies of its possible
~ccurrence."~~
Whether we can generalize the association of the gender
difference with this contrast between the two conceptions of
morality is certainly a debatable empirical question. However,
it is not Gilligan's purpose to make this generalization. As she
says, "The different voice I describe is characterized not by
gender but by theme."20 Her aim is to make all people, espe-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

19.
24-63.
16-22,27-38,54, 73-74, 164-67.
19.
100.
2.
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cially Americans, listen more attentively and sympathetically
to this different voice-the voice of care-which she thinks has
been overpowered by the louder voice of rights. The issue is the
message of this different voice, not the gender of the utterer.
Gilligan's ideas have not only widened the horizons of
feminism, but have also reinforced the communitarian movement and greatly enriched its content and vocabulary. To fully
comprehend the prerequisites of communal relationships, one
must first grasp Gilligan's concept of mutual care, which is not
completely reducible to participation in the pursuit of what the
community deems "the good life."
The communitarian vision also finds an eloquent jurisprudential expression in Mary Ann Glendon's recent work, Rights
Talke2' In this work, she elaborately traces and criticizes the
development, in various American legal contexts, of what she
considers to be an impoverished version of rights talk.
Glendon's aim is "not the abandonment, but the renewal,
of our strong rights tradition."22 Nevertheless, she clearly
shares the communitarian viewpoint when she criticizes the
"dominant version" of rights talk in the contemporary American
liberal democracy for "its starkness and simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its
exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective
resp~nsibilities."~~
Her communitarian sympathy is even clearer when she
looks to the American "indigenous languages of relationship
and responsibility" as sources for renewing political discourse.24These 'languages" have their own "grammar of cooperative living" reserved in the "varied communities of memory
and mutual aid," that are, "the seedbeds of civic virtue" like
"families, religious communities and other primary groups,"
which she urges people t o revitali~e.~'
The preceding section has given only a skeletal description
of the communitarian movement now conspicuous in the American intellectual landscape. Hopefully, this discussion has made

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

GLENDON,supra note 4.
Id. at xii.
Id. at x.
Id. at xii.
See id. at xii-xiii.
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audible the voice calling for community in the country which
Glendon calls "the land of rights."26

111. THE CALLFOR RIGHTSIN A LANDOF COMMUNITY

A. Communitarianism and Kaishashugi
i n Contemporary Japan
The communitarian vision described above has an affmity
to what many consider to be the Japanese outlook on human
life and morality. This a f h i t y is manifest in at least four characteristics deemed salient in Japanese culture and society.
First, the primacy of group loyalty, said to be a basic feature of
the Japanese mind, results in a weak commitment to such
universal principles as human rights, justice, and fairness-principles that theoretically do not discriminate between
insiders and outsiders.27 Some Western observers even view
this focus on group loyalty as a root cause of the current friction between Japan and Western countries.28In this regard, it
may be noted that cultural and contextual relativism (as implied by communitarian meta-ethics) is popular in Japan and is
sometimes relied on to defend "the uniqueness" or "the particularity" of Japanese society against Western criticism based on
universalist p r i n ~ i p l e s . ~ ~
Second, the Japanese group orientation not only determines individual preferences, but also penetrates individual
self-identity. To put it in the communitarian language, individuals in contemporary Japan are, despite increased social
mobility, still far more apt to be "situated selves" rather than
"unencumbered selves."30An important type of group that currently attracts Japanese loyalty and helps provide self-identity
is the h i s h a or business c~rporation.~'
The fact that a person
is working for Nissan, for example, is not just information

26.
Id at 1.
27.
See, eg., CHIE NAKANE,
JAPANESE
SOCIETY (1973).
28.
See, e.g., James Fallows, Containing Japan, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
May 1989,
OF JAPANESE POWER:PEOPLEAND
at 40-54; KAREL. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA
POWCS IN A STATELESSNATION8-11, 202-94 (1989).
29.
VAN WOLFEREN,
supm note 28, at 245-48, 293.
30.
For the contrast between the two types of selves, see supm part IIA.2.
31.
In fact, in discussions about dominant human character types the term
hisha ningen is used to signify a corporate person. See, e.g., Shigeru Komago,
Kigyojin hem Tegami [Letters to Corporate People], NIHONKEIZAISHINBUN,Jan. 8,
1992, at 1; Minoru Tabata, 'Kaishashugi' no Kiki no Genshogaku [Phenomenology of
the Crisis of the Company-Cult], 12 &&DO,Summer 1992, at 43-55.
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about his job, but is usually a dominant part of who he is. A
person's job is a vital source of his self-respect, a firm basis for
his self-interpretation, and a prime determinant of the social
recognition he gains.
Third, the Japanese indigenous moral language places
special emphasis on the primacy of collective goals over private
interests, common good over individual rights, and civic responsibility to engage in public affairs over personal freedom and
privacy. The term symbolizing this primacy is messhi hoko,
which means the virtue of sacrificing one's private life to public
service, or more literally, self-annihilation in the service of
public interests.
The phrase itself is now unpopular because it was
rampantly used or abused for purposes of military mobilization
in World War 11. But as will be shown below in connection with
k ~ r o s h i ?a~postwar social equivalent of messhi hoko still exists in the way contemporary Japanese employees devotedly
sacrifice themselves to their companies (kaisha) so a s to be
called kigyo senshi, o r corporate warriors.33 For a devoted
kigyo senshi, the kaisha is not just a private business entity
with which he has a contractual relationship, but a public or
quasi-public space in his world which overwhelms other public
spheres in importance. A corporate warrior would not hesitate
to say he is rendering his hoko (public service) to his kaisha.
Finally, the vagueness of self-other differentiation, which
implies the importance of human interdependence (anme),
connection (en) and the mutual responsibility of caring
(kikubari), is often ascribed to the core of the Japanese view of
the moral world. On the other hand, individual autonomy and
rights consciousness (kenri ishiki), which presuppose a sharp
self-other differentiation, are regarded as alien to this view.34

32. See infra part 1II.B.
33.
The term "corporate warrior" is used, for example, in the title of a book in
English on kamshi published by a group of Japanese lawyers, researchers (who
specialize in economics, medicine and labor problems) and wives of Itamshi victims.

NATIONAL
DEFENSECOUNSEL FOR VICTIMS OF KAROSHI, KAROSHI: WHEN THE TORPORATE WARRIOR"DIES (1990) [hereinafter KAROSHI].
34.
TAKEODOI, THE ANATOMYOF DEPENDENCE (John Bester trans., 1977);
E s m HAMAGUCHI, KANJINSWGI NO SHAKAI
NIHON[JAPANAS A C O N T ~ A L I S T
SOCIETY]
(1982); E m HAMAGUCHI, NIHONRASHISA
NO SAIHAKKEN
[JAPANESENESS
REDISCOVERED] (1988); TAKEYOSHI KAWASHIMA, NIHONJIN
NO HO-ISHIKI [LEGAL
CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE] (1967). For a recent discussion on the subject in
the context of a philosophical reexamination of the concept of legal person, see
Stephen C. Hicks, On the Citizen and the Legal Person: Toward the Common
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In short, the moral world where the Japanese are said to live is
very much like Gilligan's concept of an ethic of care.
Whether this picture of the Japanese moral world is more
of an ideological fiction than a description of reality is debatable.35 I believe it is as much ideological as real. At any rate,
it is more or less self-fulfillingy influencing the Japanese i n
shaping their moral self-understanding. Many Japanese, if
informed of Gilligan's work,s6 would certainly think that she
is describing Japan's own moral voice when she speaks in
terms of an ethic of care. I . . fact, a Japanese developmental
psychologist reported, based on empirical data, that the relative
importance of the mother-child relationship (as compared with
the father-child relationship) in the upbringing of Japanese
children tended to render the moral development of the Japanese better fitted to Gilligan's model than to Kohlberg's."
The foregoing discussion has compared the communitarian
vision emerging in the United States with the characteristically
Japanese mode of human existence and moral life to show the
affinity between the two. However, the preceding treatment of
kaishu as a n important form of constitutive community may
surprise or perplex those contemporary communitarian Americans who tend to regard business corporations as enemies to
traditional communitarianism. A few more words about the
character of Japanese corporations are therefore required.

Ground of Jurisprudence, Social Theory, and Comparative Law as the Premise of a
Future Community, and the Role of the Self Therein, 59 U . CM. L. REV. 789, 82130 (1991).
35.
For recent discussions on the question of whether Japanese society is, and
will be, non-individualistic, see KOJIN, KANJIN, NIHONJIN:JAPANOMGY
0 KOETE
[THE INDIVIDUAL,THE CONTEXTUAL
AND THE JAPANESE:
BEYOND
JAPANOLOGY](Ross
Mouer & Yoshio Sugirnoto eds., 1987); RONALDP. DORE,WILL THE 21ST CENTURY
WORLDBE THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM?42-117 (1991). In this connection, it may
be noted that some Japanese and Western scholars have been critically reexamining the supposed non-litigious character of the Japanese which Kawashima come&ed with the weakness of rightsconsciousness in Japan in his standard work.
KAWASHW, supra note 34. Cf. WSAO
O m , NIHONJINNO Ho-KANNEN: SENOTEKI
NOTION OF LAW: A COMPARISON
WITH
Ho-KANNEN TON0 HIKAKU [THE JAPANESE
THE &XXDENTAL
NOTIONOF LAW] (1983); JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY
WlTHOT
POWER: LAW UD.
THE JAPANESE
PARADOX83-116 (1991). Skepticism about the
alleged Japanese nonlitigiousness, however, does not necessarily imply the view
that Japan is an individualistic society. For example, Haley holds that the absence
of aversion to litigation is compatible with Japanese society. Id. See also infra note
86.
36. See supra part 1I.B.
37.
Akiko Yamagishi, Futatsu no Dotolulsei to Taijin Kankei [Two Moralities
and Interpersonal Relations], 1 JUNTENDO
IRYOTANKIDAIGAKU
KTYO 48-55 (1990).
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A variety of factors give a communal character to Japanese

corporation^.^^ The so-called three sacred regalia of Japanese
labor-management relations, which consist of lifetime employment, promotion by seniority, and in-company labor unions
based on the capital-labor conciliation policy, have undeniably
strengthened the identification of employees with their companies. A penetrating analysis has recently been presented by
scholars who use the concept of kaishashugi, a new term coined
by combining kaisha and shugi (ism), to characterize Japanese
labor-management relation^.^' Kaishashugi also refers to the
entire Japanese social system because that system is strongly
influenced by the economic structure based on labor-management relation^.^'
Koji Baba, a leading analyst of kaishashugi, formulates the
concept of kaishashugi by combining these three sacred regalia
with the following four features: 1)sharing of membership and
control of kaisha by labor and management to the exclusion of
stockholders, and the homogenization of labor and management
by recruiting management from labor; 2) limited and invisible
inequality of wages and management participation among the
employees, which makes their communal solidarity and competitive motivations compatible; 3) close cooperation, constant
communication, and absence of class distinctions between bluecollar and white-collar workers; and 4) long-term business
relations between corporations, which help bring about communal relationships at the intercorporate leveL4' In sum, Baba
says, "kaishashugi is an exquisite combination of the capitalistic competition with the communal or socialistic relation^.'"'^
He observes that kaishashugi has made contemporary Japan a
country where "the stockholders' control of corporations is too
weak for us to find the Big Capitalists; the income differentials

38. This article merely presents some of those factors without taking sides in
the controversy about whether they are culturally, politically or economically determined.
!he term kuishashugi has no English equivalent.
39.
See, e.g., 1 GENDAINIHONSHAKAI
[THE CONTEMPORARY
JAPANESE SOCIETY]
40.
chs. 4-6 (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo ed., 1991-92); OSAMU
WATANABE,n
G
Y
0 SHIHAI M KOKKA [THE CORPORATE
DOMINANCE
AND THE STATE]
(1991); HIROSHI ~ ~ R HOJIN
A
,SHIHONSHUGI
NO KOZO [W STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATE
CAPITALISM] (rev. ed., 1990).
Koji Baba, Gendrri Sekui to Nihon Kaishashugi [The Contemporary World
41.
and the Raishashugi in Japan], in 1 GENDAINIHONSHAKAI,
supra note 40, at 2983.

42.

Id. at 71.
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are generally small; there is little class distinction i n wages or
work conditions; there is workers' 'participation7 in management; on the whole it is difficult to find class differences.'"13
As a Marxist economist, Baba is not completely happy with
the prevalence of kaishashugi. He adds, in an ambivalent tone:
[Ulnder the rule of kaishashugi, workers are dealt with as
shutai [self-ruling agents as opposed to the objects of control
to which "the alienated laborers" in the classical sense were
reduced], or rather they are coerced to be shutai both by the
competitive and communal elements, ending up pursuing
their self-development only in the direction of improving their
productivity for the sake of kaisha as the capital.44

Despite its ultramodern economy, Japan has preserved its
community-oriented character. In fact, as the prevalence of
kaishashugi shows, Japan's communal character has contributed to its tremendous economic growth. The economic growth of
postwar Japanese society has, in turn, caused Japan to reproduce or even reinforce its community-oriented character.
Although the leading Japanese intellectuals involved in the
postwar enlightenment movement, who were called
kindaishugisha (modernists), urged people to accept individualistic valuesP5 Japanese society continued to be a land of community in its basic structure. Ironically enough, the communal
traits of Japanese society which those modernist intellectuals
regarded as signs of its "backwardness" closely resemble the
communitarian alternative now emerging in the land of rights,
the United States, which epitomizes modernity.
Does all of this mean that it is time for Americans to learn
from the Japanese? The answer is both yes and no. Yes, because there is something to learn from Japanese experiences.
No, because the lesson Japan can offer is anything but "do as
we do." The dark side of Japan's land of community is at least
as dark as the dark side of America's land of rights. As for
Japan, there is now an urgent need to heed the voice that calls
for increased respect for individual rights.

43.
Id. at 64.
44.
Id. at 74. The inserted explanation in brackets of the meaning of shutai, a
Japanese equivalent of the German word das Subjekt in its philosophical use, is
based on Baba's passage just preceding the quoted one. Baba also warns that the
hyperproductivity of kaishashugi will sustain excessive mass consumption societies
and thereby aggravate environmental disruption and other social ills. Id. at 77-83.
45.
See, eg., DORE,supra note 35, at 62-65.
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B. The Dark Side of Japanese Communality:
Karoshi as Symbolic Death

The way people die sometimes discloses the dilemma or
contradictions inherent in their form of social life. This kind of
death may be referred to as a symbolic death. Emile Durkheim
gave a classical example of the analysis of symbolic death in
his extensive work, S ~ i c i d e . 4He
~ explained that "egoistic suicide" and "anomic suicide" derive from the individualistic form
of social life. When communal cohesion is loosened, individuals
are exposed to two great dangers: first, ceasing to find anything
meaningful or valuable for which to live; and second, losing the
ability t o control one's desires and frustrations, and thereby
losing one's psychological stability. The first danger makes
individuals vulnerable to egoistic suicide, the second to anomic
sui~ide.~'On the other hand, altruistic suicide results from
the collectivistic form of social life which minimizes the value of
individual lives by merging them into a collective entity.48
By exploring this idea of symbolic death, one discovers a
revealing example of the dark side of Japanese communality.
This is because contemporary Japanese society has its own
kind of symbolic death, although it is different from any of the
types of suicide Durkheim discussed. This symbolic death is
called karoshi, or death from 0verwork.4~
Karoshi seizes workers in the form of brain hemorrhage,
heart failure, cerebral or myocardial infarction and the like, as
the cumulative effect of extended overwork (habitualized long
overtime and few days off). Among the other causal factors are
exhausting commuting conditions and the psychological and
physiological stress of job transfers unaccompanied by one's
family (tanshin funin).50 Karoshi victims do not kill themselves-they "burn away."
The exact frequency of karoshi is difficult t o determine
because of insuEcient data and the difficulty of proving causal
connections. However, it is certainly not uncommon, as is evi46. E m DURKHEIM,SUICIDE:
A SlvDy IN SOCIOLOGY
(George Simpson ed. &
John A. Spaulding trans., 1951).
47. Id. at 152-216,241-76.
48. Id. at 217-41.
49. To date, the most detailed English publication on krrroshi is KAROSHI, supra
note 33, which examines the complex problem of kamshi in its social, legal, economic and medical aspects.
50. Id. at 8-10,98-102.
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denced by the Karoshi Hotlines, a voluntary consultation-byphone service program. When a group of Japanese lawyers and
doctors opened the Karoshi Hotlines in seven major cities on
June 18, 1988, they received 135 calls from the family and
relatives of karoshi victims on the first day alone. During the
following two years, they handled 1806 cases.51
Karoshi has become a serious social issue in Japan not
only because the reported cases have been increasing in number, but also because the way karoshi victims die represents
the difficult living conditions shared by ordinary people. According to a 1991 survey, one out of five (and one out of four
male) office workers in Tokyo fear that they may suffer
karo~hi.'~
Moreover karoshi is a classless death. It can happen
to anyone irrespective of age, sex, occupation, or post. For example, directors and managers constituted about fifteen percent of the karoshi victims in the 1806 cases handled by the
Karoshi hot line^.^' The fact that the sense of vulnerability to
karoshi is widely shared seems to reveal more about Japanese
society than its actual frequency does. This fact is part of the
reason why karoshi can be called a symbolic death.
A human dimension of karoshi is poignantly expressed in a
note left by Toshitsugu Yagi, a karoshi victim who, until his
death, rarely returned home from work before midnight. He
died in 1987 from a myocardial infarction at the age of fortythree.54 In his note, Yagi likened "today's armies of corporate
workers" on their "daily commuter trains packed to overflowing" to the "slaves [who] were loaded onto slave ships and carYagi concluded that today's corporied off to the new
rate warriors are more miserable than slaves were because
"corporate slaves . . . don't even share the simplest of pleasures

51. Id. at 7.
52. Toshin ni Hatarah OL: Sarariman no Rknko Chosa [Health Survey of the
m e Workers in Tokyo], ASAHI SHINBUN,
June 2, 1992, at 26 (quoting the survey
of working conditions of office workers in Tokyo conducted by Chuo Rosei Jimusho
(the Tokyo metropolitan central office for labor administration) in Odober and
November, 1991) [hereinafter Health Survey]. This survey gives a relatively conservative estimate. Another survey reports that 48% of the questioned workers replied
that they felt "anxiety about karoshi." Kishio Hobara, Rodojikansei no Arikata
[What the Working Hours ReguLation Is and Should Be Lih], J U R I ~ , May 1,
1992, at 261 (quoting a newspaper article in Yam S m m , Feb. 13, 1992).
53. KARosHI, supra note 33, at i.
54. For a detailed description of the conditions of life for Yagi and his family
before and after his death, see id. at 37-46.
55. Id. at 4.
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that those forced laborers of ages past enjoyed: the right to sit
down a t the dinner table with their families."56 If nothing
else, Yagi's note should "inform people around the world about
potential hazards contained in Japanese-style management and
serious distortions underlying the Japanese economy."57
In the preface to the English report on karoshi, published
by the National Defense Counsel for Victims of Karoshi, the
authors proclaim:
It is said that all human rights are based on respect for the
individual. We believe that the freedom of an individual to
live and die naturally without being subjected to destruction
by others is the foundation of all human rights. We therefore
believe that conditions and practices which destroy workers'
health and life should never be t~lerated.~'

This is a forcible call for individual rights. So far, however, the
legal response to the issues it raises has been insufficient or
even nonexistent in Japan.
Part of the problem results from Japan's lack of effective
regulations. Although the Labor Stand&& Law stipulates that
the maximum working hours should be forty hours per
week,59this is nothing more than a shabby facade because the
same law allows the Cabinet t o extend the limit up to fortyeight hours by its ordinance.60Since 1991, the limit set by the
ordinance has been forty-four hours per week. The law is further diluted by a provision6' authorizing the employer and the
labor union composed of the majority of the employees (or other
employee representatives) to raise the legal limit by agreement,
the so-called saburoku kyotei (the three-six agreement).62
In 1991, the Ministry of Labor developed an administrative
guidance plan to reduce overtime. The Plan did not make much

56. Id.
57. Id. at 111.
58. Id. at IV.
59. RODOKLTLTNHO[Labor Standards Law] art. 32 (Japan) (Law No. 99 of 1987).
R5d6kijunh6 [hereinafter ROIUHO] was originally enacted in 1947. The statute in its
current form includes many amendments made on various occasions since then.
60. Id. art 131 ¶ 1.
61. Id. art. 36.
62. KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 85-86; Koichiro Yamaguchi, Rodokijunho
Minaoshi no Ronten [The Labor Standards Law Reconsidered: Main Issues],
JURISUTO, Apr. 1, 1992, at 43-44;Seigo Mori, Jikangai Rodo no Sakugen to Hoteki
Kisei [The Curtailment of Overtime Work and the Legal R~gulationsl,JURISUTO,
Apr. 1, 1992, at 58-63.
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sense, however, because the suggested limit on overtime was
450 to 780 hours per year, and work on holidays was disregarded.63 Thus, there is no mandatory legal limit to maximum
working hours, except for certain highly dangerous occupat i o n ~female
, ~ ~ w0rkers,6~and minors.66
Other provisions of the Labor Standards Law also fail to
discourage excessive overtime. The premium rate for overtime
required by the Labor Standards Law is only twenty-five pertoo low to motivate management to hire additional employees instead of relying on overtime work. As for vacation,
the law entitles workers to ten to twenty paid holidays per
year, depending on the length of employment,6' but there is
no provision about the minimum number of holidays to be
actually taken. On average, Japanese workers take only half
the paid holidays to which they are entitled.69 Finally, enforcement of the law is so ineffective that the so-called sabisu
zangyo (free service overtime which is unrecorded and unpaid)
is a normal pra~tice.~'
The Japanese courts have also refused to curb overtime
abuses. In 1991, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled in Tanaka
v. Hitachi, Inc7l that an individual worker has no right t o refuse an employer's request for overtime if the time does not
exceed the limit agreed upon by the employer and the union.
The court upheld the employer's disciplinary measure of dismissing the plaintiff who refused such requests. The saburoku
kyotei (the three-six agreement) involved in Tanaka included,
among its conditions for acceptable overtime, such all-embracing and unrestrained language as "the necessity of working
overtime to attain production goals." The Japanese Supreme
Court acknowledged the agreement's comprehensiveness but

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Yamaguchi, supra note 62, at 45-46.
ROKIHO art. 36, proviso (Japan) (Law No. 99 of 1987).
Id. art. 64, 1 2 (Law No. 45 of 1985).
Id. art. 60 (Law No. 99 of 1987).
Id. art. 37 (Law No. 49 of 1947).
Id. art. 39, 91 1-6 (Law No. 99 of 1987).
See Susumu Noda, Magarikado ni Kita Nenkyu Hori: 'Jitan Sokushin' no

Nakade [Vacation Law at the Crossroads: Under the Working Hours Curtailment
Drive'], JURISUM,Apr. 1, 1992, at 49.
Mori, supra note 62, at 59, 63; KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 66-67, 87-88.
70.
71.
Judgment of Nov. 28, 1991, Saik6sai Daiichi Shohotei [Supreme Court, 1st
Petty Bench] 774 HANTA 73 (Japan).
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held that it was reasonable and that it met the purpose of
Article 36 of the Labor Standards Law.72
The situation is no better in terms of workers' compensation benefits. Karoshi victims are rarely compensated under the
current workers' compensation insurance system because the
restrictive coverage formula set by the Ministry of Labor focuses only on the work load immediately prior to the employee's
death.7s
On the whole, Japanese labor unions have not zealously
addressed the problems raised by karoshi. In fact, the labor
unions have contributed to the problem because they often join
management in legitimizing the conditions leading to overwork
by entering into saburoku k ~ o t e i . The
~ ~ structure of
k a i s h a s h ~ g ihas
~ ~ led the unions to identify their members'
collective interests with the prosperity and growth of their
kaisha. They have therefore cooperated with management to
make the success of their kaisha a high priority. In addition,
the unions realize that lifetime employment structurally
requires dependence on overtime as a buffer against any eventual economic pressure for layoffs.76
Japanese employees work extremely hard and thereby
expose themselves to the dangers of karoshi for a variety of
reasons. A fundamental explanation is the prevalence of
kaishashugi, which fosters and requires the strong identification of workers with their kaisha. The above-mentioned 1991
survey reports that 24.8% of the respondents ascribed the primary cause of karoshi to voluntary overwork and forty-three
percent to the overwork demanded by the worker's k a i ~ h a . ~ ~
Voluntary overwork may involve the workers' self-interested
pursuit of a higher income and promotion. But their self interests alone cannot give the full explanation because a considerable part of voluntary overwork is sabisu zangyo, unpaid and
unrecorded overtime. For a deeper explanation, therefore, we
must look to the workers' loyalty to their kaisha,which derives
from their identification with the kaisha. Demanded overwork,

72. Id. at 77.
73. KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 89-97.
NIEION NO KOU) [THE
74. Id. at 77-80;OSAMU WATANABE,YUTAKANASHARAI
STRUCTURE OF JAPANAS AN AFFLUENT &lCIETY] 26 (1990).
75. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
76. See genemlly Yamaguchi, supm note 62, at 45. For a criticism of this "buffer theory," see KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 70-72.
77. See Health Survey, supra note 52.
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on the other hand would not be as prevalent without the general practice of reinforcing this identification. Workers pressured
to overwork would be willing and able to "get out of the rat
race" by switching jobs if they had no strong sense of belonging
to their kaisha and if other kaisha were less exclusive or less
discriminatory to those freely moving workers who have no
such sense of loyalty.
Exposure to the danger of karoshi is itself a violation of
individual rights, but i t only symbolizes a more general and
extensive undermining of individual rights by kaishashugi.
Yagi's analogy of contemporary Japanese workers to slaves
cannot be brushed aside as mere rhetoric.
I must hasten to add, however, that this corporate slavery
is not a classical capitalist exploitation imposed on workers. It
is part of the social structure that has been widely (though
with increasing ambivalence) accepted as a pillar of the common interest by those enslaved. For example, a n individual
employee who refuses overtime work to spend more time with
his family o r on personal pursuits would be censured as
wagamama (selfish) not only by his boss, but also by his coll e a g u e ~ The
. ~ ~ boss is in the same, or even a worse, situation
due t o his heavier load of responsibility. The collective interests
of the kaisha community take precedence over an individual
worker's right t o lead the kind of life that enables him to situate his identity and seek self-fulfillment outside his kaisha.
As discussed earlier, karoshi is different from any of the
three types of suicide discussed by Durkheim because it is not
literally suicide.79 Moreover, karoshi has no resemblance to
what Durkheim presents as the Japanese examples of altruistic
suicide, such as the samurais' disembowelment (harakiri) and
the collective suicide by "the sectarians of Amida."80
Durkheim argues that these deeds share such motivations as
hypersensitivity to insult, contempt for "clinging to life," re-

Tabata, supm note 31, at 45, reports the case of a worker who was cen78.
sured as taihenna wagamama (very selfish) by his colleagues and the labor union
because he refused the request for tanshin funin (job transfer without his wife's accompaniment). According to a 1992 survey, more than 5Wo of the questioned workers replied that they felt hesitation in going home from work earlier than their
colleagues who are working overtime. 'Kaishushugi' Aikuwarazu rKaishashugi' Remains Preualent], NIHONKEIZAI SHINBUN,
Aug. 15, 1992, at 4 (quoting a survey by
Nihon Risachi Soken [Japan Research Institute]).
79.
See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
80.
supra note 46, at 222-25.
DURKHEIM,
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ligious fanaticism, and superstitions with other practices of
optional altruistic suicide "associated with the most fundamental moral characteristics of lower s~cieties."~~
Karoshi has
nothing to do with these motivations.
At a deeper level, however, karoshi has something in common with altruistic suicide. Durkheim's insight into the fundamental sociological cause of the latter also reveals the cause of
the former. In both cases, a person takes a road leading to
death because "society holds him in too strict tutelage" and
because he is captured in a state "where the ego is not its own
property, where it is blended with something not itself, where
the goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one of the
groups in which it participate^.'"^
Karoshi, therefore, is not an isolated personal tragedy. Just
as egoistic and anomic suicides symbolize the anxiety and despair of the individualistic society, karoshi symbolizes the tension and distress of a hyperindustrialized and secularized
communitarian society, not of a primitive and religious community. It symbolizes the deep-seated dilemma of contemporary
Japanese society-a society that has experienced what Baba
calls "an exquisite combination of capitalistic competition with
communal or socialistic relation^."^^
This dilemma can aptly be so called, for human dimensions
of life in contemporary Japan have been impoverished by the
very same social regimentation that has brought about the
success of Japanese society-its miraculous growth into a
keizai taikoku, or economic world power. This dilemma overshadows the lives of ordinary men and women who have been
lucky enough not to meet karoshi or its concomitant family
tragedy, as well as those who have not been so fortunate.

81.
82.
83.

Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 221.
Baba, supra note 41, at 71.
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C. Tyranny of Intermediary Communities
Awareness of this dilemma is increasing in Japan.84 The
labor front, business circles and the government are now jointly
discussing necessary legal reforms in the area of working
hours.85 The issue, however, is deeper and broader than the
mere length of working hours. It is deeper because what must
now be examined and changed is the structure of kaishashugi
itself. Unless the excessive communal cohesion of kaisha is
loosened, Japan's society will not stop reproducing corporate
persons or corporate warriors whose individual lives are impoverished and deformed. The issue is broader than the number of
working hours because kaishashugi is only one specific, although dominant, embodiment of the more general
communitarian character of Japanese society.
I t should be pointed out that Japan, like other industrialized countries, indeed has its own share of unencumbered individuals who do not feel constrained by communitarian norms.
But Japanese society is basically an intricate web of various
intermediary communities, each of which has a tenacious hold
on the lives of its individual members and a relatively strong
group autonomy vis-a-vis the state, as evidenced by the ability
of these groups to maintain their internal order by extralegal
and informal sanctions.86 Each community fosters group

Id. at 78-80; WATANABE,
supra note 74, at 9-42, 371-76; Komago, supra
84.
note 31; Nihonjin to Kaisha Tokubetsu Shuzaihan [Special Reporting Group on
"The Japanese and Corporations"], Nihonjin to Kaishu, Dai-4Bu: Hokaisuru Kyodo
Genso [The Japanese and Corporations, Part 4: The Common Illusion Shuttered],
serially published in NIHONKEIZAI SHINBUN, Aug. 6-8, 10, 11, 1991, respectively at
FOR A CONVIVIAL
1; TATSUOINOUE, ET AL., KYOSEIHEN0 BOKEN[AN EXPMRATION
SOCIJiTY] 8-35 (1992).
85. Zadankai: Jitansokushinho no Roso [Symposium: Conceptions of Working
Hours Curtailment Law],JURISUM,Apr. 1, 1992, at 10-42. Symposium contributors
re~resentedbusiness circles. the labor front. and the Ministw of Labor.
86.
Haley has recently examined this structure of Japanese society and its
relation to law in a sober historical and sociological analysis. See HALEY, supra
note 35. He came to the following conclusion:
For better or for worse, therefore, Japan is a society ordered more by
extralegal and o h n quite coercive community and group controls than
law or government power . . . . The state remains active and interventionist, but its capacity to control or maintain order depends ultimately
upon its ability to persuade and cajole in order to achieve consensus. In
this context law and the formal mechanisms of law enforcement function
more as tools for consensus building and leverage than coercive instruments of state control.
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loyalty, collective identity, and a sense of responsibility for
mutual care among its members, but tends to narrow and homogenize the members' mental horizons and to apply the pervasive pressure of social tyranny on deviant individuals, who
seek a form of life different from the community's shared lifestyle.87

Id. a t 200.
The only real antagonists to [this system] are those who seek either a
concentration of power or its even greater diffusion through personal,
individual empowerment-goals that, from the example of the concomitant
rise of individualism and state power in the West, are not as inconsistent
a s they may a t first appear.
Id. at 190-91. In other words, the "power brokers of contemporary Japan are those
who can manipulate best the community sanctions and the informal, consensual
levers of coercion, however peripheral they may be in terms of Japan's hierarchical
concentration of authority a t the center." Id. at 191.
Q., 0ct.-Dec.
87.
Yoichi Higuchi, When Society is Itself the Tyrant, 35 JAPAN
1988, a t 350, 354. Higuchi, one of the leading constitutional lawyers in Japan,
forcefully argues the point in the following passage:
Mill insisted on the importance of "a limit to the legitimate interference
of collective opinion with individual independence." One hundred and
thirty years later in Japan, freedom from political authority (the state)
has come to receive wide support. Freedom from societal authority, on the
other hand, tends to be offset by theories about the rights of juridical
persons and a "segmented society" [i.e. intermediary association]. The
former recognizes juridical persons (potential bearers of vast societal authority) and natural persons (staunch resisters of such authority) as equal
bearers of human rights, thus opening the door to legal countenance of
oppression against decisions based on the will of the individual. The theory of a segmented society, meanwhile, by seeking self-discipline of groups
[in other words, group autonomy], abandons the possibility of aid through
the courts in the solution of intrasegmental disputes [in other words, disputes within an intermediary association].
I t would seem that within the social relationships that exist before a
dispute ever reaches court, most Japanese fear becoming true individuals,
each with his or her unique opinion, and instead bury all differences in
the majority opinion . . . . I n schools those who rebel against picayune
rules restricting student clothing and hair styles are treated as heretics,
while at the office workers are expected to become "company men" who
devote themselves above all to their work, a t whatever wst to their personal lives. All of these phenomenon are direct expressions of the widespread tendency to smother individuality.
Id. at 354 (comments in brackets are the author's).
Haley quotes part of the same passage and substantiates it with some examples of the dark side of communal controls in Japan that are often hidden by the
'tision of Japan as a society dominated by closely knit, interdependent communities and carefully cultivated, mutually supportive interpersonal networks enveloped
in the rhetoric of harmony." HALEY, supra note 35, a t 183-84. For a survey of
theories about segmented societies (bubunshahiron), see Koji Sato, Ho, Kenryoku,
Shakai: 'Bubunshakniron' ni Yosete [Law, Power and Society: Toward 'the Theory of
JITTEIHO NO KISORIRON[3 CONTEMPOSubsocieties'], in LII GENDAIHOTETSUGAKU:
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This social structure has proved its remarkable efficiency
in mobilizing people to attain collective goals, such as economic
growth, without extensively resorting to legal coercion backed
by state power. But the cost for this structure has also been
great in terms of individual rights. In addition to the right to
life, of which karoshi victims have been deprived, the right to
individual autonomy and dignity have been callously neglected
simply because the group autonomy of intermediary communities has been so respected that state power, including that of
the judiciary, has rarely interfered with community practices
that violate individual rights.
A case in point is Tanaka v. Hitachi, Inc.,8' in which the
Japanese Supreme Court held that the management and labor
union of a h i s h a can jointly force a n individual employee to
work beyond the legal (if not mandatory) limit of working
hours, even against his will. This is only one of many examples. Japan's Supreme Court has also allowed a kaisha to discriminate against an individual in employment on the basis of
his political beliefss9 and allowed a kaisha to make a political
donation in its corporate capacity.g0
But kaisha are not the only types of intermediary communities that enjoy such strong group autonomy. In the matter of
religious freedom, group autonomy is also given priority over
individual rights. In 1988, the Japanese Supreme Court dismissed a Christian woman's compensation and injunction
claims against the Veteran's Association (VA) and the SelfDefense Forces (SDF). Despite her explicit and repeated refusal, the VA and SDF had jointly arranged to enshrine her late
husband, a n SDF serviceman killed in a n accident while on
duty, in a Shinto shrine. The Court based its decision partly on
the ground that the constitutionally protected freedom of reli-

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: FOUNDATIONAL
TI-JEORLES OF THE POSITIVE LAW] 351-84
(Ryuichi Nagao & Shigeaki Tanaka eds., 1983). Here Koji Sato, another influential
constitutional lawyer in Japan, gives an ambivalent appraisal to bubunshakuimn.
He sympathizes with its pluralistic element which relativizes the state sovereignty
and reinforces the h e d o m of association, but warns against its tendency to leave
unchecked the violation of individual rights by intermediary associations. Id. at
352-58, 369-74.
88. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1991, Saik6sai Daiichi Shohotei [Supreme Court, 1st
73 (Japan).
Petty Bench], 774 HANTA
89. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1973 (Takano v. Mitsubishi Jushi, Inc.), Saik6sai
Daihotei [Supreme Court, Grand Bench] 724 HANJI 18 (Japan).
Judgment of June 24, 1970 (Arita v. Kojima), Saik6sai Daihotei [Supreme
90.
Court, Grand Bench] 597 HANJI 3 (Japan).
RARY
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giongl implied that she, as an individual, had a duty to show
"tolerance" for the religious freedom of the Shinto shrine.92
Neighborhood communities, which once prospered as the
lower reaches of government in prewar and wartime Japan,
have generally become less pervasive in terms of their influence on everyday life, partly because of the population's increased mobility. But there still remains a strong national
consciousness that neighbors should maintain communal relationships (mutual aid and amicability) with each other and that
the law should not interfere with those relationships. This consciousness sometimes comes out in an explosive way, as it did
in the so-called rinjin sosho (neighborhood litigation) incident
in Suzuka City, Mie Prefe~ture.'~
In 1977, a couple living in a Suzuka suburb filed a damage
suit against their neighbors because the couple's three-year-old
son drowned in an irrigation pond while being tended for a
brief time by the neighbors. The accident happened after the
neighbors let the plaintiffs son play outside with their own
four-year-old son without any adult supervision. In 1983, the
Tsu District Court deemed both sides negligent and, according
to the comparative negligence laws, awarded the plaintiffs
about five million yen.94
The media reported the case using headlines that were
critical of the award, such as "Judgment Hard on Kind Neighbor~.'*~
The media reports triggered formidable forces of social
tyranny against the plaintiff^.'^ The plaintiffs received ap91.
Kenpa [Constitution] art. XX (Japan).
92.
Judgment of June 1, 1988 (Kuni v. Nakaya), Saik6sai Daihotei [Supreme
Court, Grand Bench] 1277 Hanji 34 (Japan). Commenting on this decision, Higuchi
says, "Majority opinions that treat a shrine's freedom of religion as equivalent to
that of the plaintiff, and require the exercise of mutual tolerance,' actually give
the shrine's rights precedence over those of individuals." Higuchi, supm note 87, at
354.
This incident shocked the general public as well as jurists and was exten93.
sively discussed in law journals and other publications in Japan. See, e.g., RINJIN
MSHO TO HO NO YAKUWARI[THE NEIGHBORHOOD
LITIGATIONAM) THE ROLE OF
LAW] (Eiichi Hoshino ed., 1984) [hereinafter RINJIN]; TAKESHIKO=
ET AL.,
RINJIN MSHO NO KENRN [A STClDY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD
L~TIGATION]
(1989).
For a detailed bibliography, see id. at 252-54.
Judgment of Feb. 25, 1983 (Yamanaka v. Kondo), Chisai [District Court],
94.
495 HANTA 64 (Japan) reprinted in RINJIN,supra note 93, at 204-33. The court
found that the plaintiffs were 70% negligent. Id.
95.
MAnvrcm SHINBUN (Tokyo), Feb. 25, 1983 (evening ed.), at 15; see also
KOJIMAET AL., supra note 93, at 243-44.
96.
RINJIN, supra note 93, at 120-36, 193-97; KOJIMA ET AL., supm note 93, at
14-16, 243-44; HALEY, supm note 35, at 114.
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proximately six hundred phone calls and three hundred letters
within the following week. Most of the letters and calls were
anonymous and included accusations and threats, such as "Are
you using your dead boy to make money?"; "Devils!"; "Do you
want me to set fire to your house?"; and so forth. Moreover, the
dead boy's father was fired from his subcontracted plumbing
job the day after the judgment. The boy's mother was denied
service by shopkeepers in the neighborhood and his older sister
was teased at school.
Crushed by all of this, the plaintiffs offered to withdraw
their
To curb this alarming reaction, the Ministry of
Justice issued a very unusual announcement stating, in effect,
that the threats and insults made against the plaintiffs were a
very regrettable violation of their constitutionally protected
right of access to the courts?' The Ministry emphasized the
importance of this right and stated that it should never be
violated in this way again." While the propriety of this parthe litigation and
ticular litigation is quite
its aftermath clearly demonstrate how easily the virtues of a
neighborhood community can turn into cruel intolerance and
social tyranny in a country where respect for individual rights
has no important place in its shared traditions.
Schools must also be mentioned here, not only because
they are a seedbed for communal cohesion in other social
spheres, but also because they are themselves a n important
type of intermediary community whose group autonomy takes
precedence over individual rights. Japanese schools have been
effective in raising the average achievement of the country's
children. But this effectiveness is at least partly due to the fact
that many schools strive to control children's lives literally
"from head to toe" by meticulous school regulations and discipline, sometimes including corporal punishment. The repressed
and frustrated children often vent their discontent by persistent group harassment of certain target children (gime). This

97.
When it was reported that the defendants refused to agree to the plaintiffs'
withdrawal, they were also harassed by anonymous calls and letters, though to a
lesser extent. Eventually the defendants agreed and the decision was nulltfied. See
RINJIN, supra note 93, at 121-22; KOJIMAET AL., supm note 93, at 15.
Ken@ [Constitution] art. XXXII (Japan).
98.
99.
The Ministry of Justice's full statement is quoted in RINJIN, supra note 93,
at 234; KOJIMA ET At., supra note 93, at 15-16.
100. For discussions on this issue, see RINJIN, supm note 93, at 65-129, 165-93;
KOJIMA ET AL., supra note 93, at 35-86, 174-212.
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treatment, combined with the smothering school control, has
driven a number of children into prolonged absence (toko kyohi)
or even suicide due to school-phobia.lol
In Kumamoto Prefecture, a public junior high school student defied a school regulation that required close-cropped
haircuts of all male students. Because of his defiance, he was
harassed by his classmates and treated as a troublemaker by
his teachers and schoolmaster. His parents, who supported
their son's act of defiance, were heckled by parents of other
students a t a PTA meeting with disparaging phrases such as
"egoists," "mean," and "get out of town!"
The student and his parents sued the schoolmaster and the
town for compensation and sought a declaration that the school
regulation was a nullity on the constitutional grounds of equality under the law,lo2 freedom of expression10S and due
process.104But in 1985, the Kumamoto District Court recognized the schoolmaster's broad discretion regarding proper
educational measures and dismissed the plaintiffs7claims.lo5
These examples all show that individual rights are an
endangered moral species in the land of community. They are
chronically endangered by the overgrowth and overprotection of
intermediary communities. There is an urgent need to save
individual rights because the consequence of their atrophy is
that human lives in Japan are now being impoverished, devastated, and even destroyed.
Karoshi exemplifies this need by revealing the human
tragedies imposed on individuals by kaisha, the most vigorous
and dominant form of intermediary community in contemporary Japan.lOG Karoshi vividly illustrates that the gap between collective prosperity of intermediary communities and
individual fulfillment of human beings is deepening and widen-

101. See generally TERUHISA HORIO
ET AL., 43 JURISUTO
mKAN %IGO TOKUSHU:
KODOMO
NO JINKEN[43 JURISUTO
SUPPLEMENTARY
FEATURE ISSUE: CHILDREN'S
HUMANRIGHTS]64-124, 211-19, 230-43 (1986); Koji Sato et al., Tokushu: Kodomo
no Jinken [Symposium on Children's Human Rights], 38 JNU TO SEIGI2-74 (1987).
102. KENW [Constitution] art. XIV (Japan).
103. Id art. XXI.
104. Id art. XXXI.
105. Judgment of Nov. 13, 1985 (Shino v. Gyokuto-Machi), Kumamoto C h i d
[District Court of Kumamoto], 570 HANTA33 (Japan).
106. Karoshi victims also include people other than company employees, such as
school teachers and civil servants. The structures of human relationships that connect and integrate them in their offices seem to be similar to those found in
hisha (although I cannot analyze them in this article).

5171 POVERTY O F RIGHTS-BLIND COMMUNALITY

545

ing. Japanese society has enjoyed a strong communal cohesion
and efficiency in the pursuit of collective goals because people
have been led to believe in the promised harmony between an
individual's happiness and the collective prosperity of the com.munity to which he belongs. But it is now becoming clearer to
many that this promised harmony is not being fulfilled.
The ultimate sense in which karoshi is a symbolic death of
contemporary Japanese society is this: it shows that Japan's
moral infrastructure is worn out and that society needs a moral
reorientation which places a greater emphasis on individual
rights.

IV. RIGHTSAS A BASISFOR OPENCOMMUNALITY
Reorientation toward individual rights does not necessitate
the sacrifice of all the positive aspects of human communality
to individualism. Rather, the Japanese experience shows that
individual rights are needed in order to enjoy a richer form of
human communality. The tyranny of intermediary communities
impoverishes both the communal and individual dimensions of
human existence.
Kaishashugi is again a good example in this regard. I t
confines individuals t o a small and narrow segment of human
communal life and thereby incapacitates them for the fuller
participation in the community. If an individual gives himself
wholly to a kaisha, he has almost nothing left to give to, or
share with, other people in other spheres of social life,
The life and death of Yagi, who presented the poignant
"slave" analogy in his note, show how kaishashugi can destroy
Japanese workers' family lives.lo7Deprived of "the right t o sit
down a t the dinner table with their families," they not only
give up "the simplest of pleasures those forced laborers of ages
past enjoyed," but also relinquish one of their most important
communal responsibilities-the responsibility to share life with
their families.los If workers cannot fulfill even their family responsibilities, they can much less afford to care about the public affairs of their local communities and other civic responsibilities. The prevalent apathy and cynicism toward politics, illustrated by low voter turnouts and lack of power change in Japanese society, are partly due to the fact that the ordinary

107.
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See KAROSHI, supra note 33, at 37-46.
Id. at 4.
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workers' participatory energy and sense of social responsibility
are absorbed by their kaisha. The narrowing of their social
horizon by kaishashugi is aptly criticized by a popular pun-like
slogan calling for attitudinal reorientation: "F'rom kaisha
ningen to shakai ningen" (from the corporate person to the
social person).log
I t may sound like a paradox to say that human communality is impoverished, not by individualism, but by a certain
communal structure in Japan. However, the apparent paradox
disappears once we understand the multiplicity of human communality. Our communality flourishes in its fullness only if we
foster and sustain our multiple memberships in the different
layers or spheres of our communal life: first, family and
friends; second, occupational, religious and various voluntary
associations; and, finally, local, ethnic, national, and global
communities.
People who berate individualism for corroding human communality are prone to overlook or minimize the conflict between the different spheres of communal life. If a certain group
in a certain sphere penetrates and dominates the whole personality of its members, it makes them indifferent or even hostile
to the other spheres of human communality. A group's strong
internal cohesion allows its members to foster interdependence,
attachment, responsibility for mutual care and other communal
virtues only among themselves. These pitfalls of kaishashugi
can have their equivalent in any of the other intermediary
communities. Some devout religious sectarians, for example,
may turn their backs on any communal relationships and responsibilities outside those of their own denomination. "Meism"
and narcissism are not exclusively individualistic maladies;
there are communal versions of these diseases that may be
more intractably antisocial.
The state in which the multiple potentialities of our human
communality are well developed and balanced may be called
open communality as opposed to the closed communality found
in the collectively narcissistic groups described above. Open
communality is sounder and richer than closed communality,
but it is also more vulnerable if put in competition with the
latter. To sustain it, we need a moral sense of balance. We
have to balance our moral lives so as not to give too much of

109.

Sato e t al., supra note 101, at 32.
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ourselves to any particular communal sphere. We need to keep
o u r individuality separate from any specific communal sphere
in order to strengthen our overall communality.
Respect for individual rights is essential to a moral environment in which we are able to cultivate this sense of balance
for three reasons. First, the concept of individual rights entails
universalism because it requires one to respect all individuals.
The universalism of rights has both normative and meta-ethical components. The normative component consists of justice,
fairness, equality, fundamental human rights, and so forth. I t
opens our eyes to the need to give due consideration to each of
the conflicting responsibilities we owe to different individuals
with whom we are related in different communal spheres, without exhausting ourselves by emphasizing one responsibility in
disregard of others. Although Gilligan considers an ethic of care
to be the opposite of a n ethic of rights,l1° in reality the former
presupposes the latter. An ethic of care requires sensitivity to
conflicts of responsibilities. But we could not keep this sensitivity unless we were committed to the belief that all the individuals to whom we may have conflicting responsibilities have a
right to due consideration. It is this belief that should prevent
us from blindly favoring just one of our responsibilities of care
to the detriment of the others.
The meta-ethical component consists of commitment to the
universal acceptability of one's own principles, which in turn
entails openness to criticism from outsiders. The meta-ethical
component gives us critical leverage for transcending the kind
of dominant convention that embodies the very narrow, exclusive, and exhausting group-centeredness of a particular community.
Second, the concept of individual rights requires us to
respect individuals as individuals. Individualism of rights includes a trump function that gives individuals a veto over the
collective goals of their community. However, we need not interpret this veto in the absolutist sense that Glendon critically
ascribes to the current American rights talk-which allows us
to disregard collective goals and general interests.''' In fact,
Ronald Dworkin, one of Glendon's targets,'* gives us a more
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GILLIGAN,supra note 14, at 19.
See generally GLENDON,supra note 4, ch. 2.
Id. at40.
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relaxed non-absolutist interpretation of individualism when h e
says:
The strength of a particular right, within a particular theory,
is a function of the degree of disservice to the goals of the
theory, beyond a mere disservice on the whole, that is necessary to justify refusing an act called for under the right. In
the popular political theory apparently prevailing in the United States, for example, individuals have rights to free public
speech on political matters and to a certain minimum standard of living, but neither right is absolute and the former i s
much stronger than the latter.Il3

According to Dworkin's interpretation, the point of individual rights is not to allow a n individual to do whatever disservice to the collective goals he likes, but to set a limit to the
degree of service to the collective goals which he cannot refuse.
Even a stronger right is not absolute in the sense that the right
holder can refuse any degree of service to the collective goals in
the name of that right. However, a n individual can refuse some
degree of that service as long as he has a right.
Dworkin's "goals of the theory" are those of a political
theory. The collective goals he has in mind are those of political
community-a community with organized coercive power. The
formal structure of rights described here can and should be
generalized to cover the relationship between rights and the
collective goals of nonpolitical communities because nonpolitical
communities can also threaten or violate their individual
members' rights by various informal pressures.
Interpreted this way, the trump function of rights is indispensable to a moral sense of balance. I t does not blind a n individual to the collective goals or interests of various communities. Rather, it enables him to participate i n various communal
. pursuits in various spheres which he thinks worthwhile by
refusing to dedicate the whole of himself to the collective pursuits of a particular group.
Lastly, individualism of rights not only enables but also
motivates us to develop our communality. It is our sense of our
own individual dignity that leads us to appreciate the same
worth of the individuality of other persons. While diagnosing

113.
ed).

RONALDDWORKIN, TAKINGRIGHTSSERIOUSLY
169-70 (1977) (emphasis add-
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the maladies of individualism, Durkheim also gave a penetrating insight into this moral power of individualism:
The fact is stressed that the motives of certain altruistic suicides reappear in slightly different forms as the basis of actions regarded by everyone as moral. ~ u ist egoistic suicide
any different? Has not the sentiment of individual autonomy
its own morality as well a s the opposite sentiment? If the
latter serves as foundation to a kind of courage, strengthening
and even hardening the heart, the other softens and moves it
to pity. Where altruistic suicide is prevalent, man is always
ready to give his life; however, a t the same time, he sets no
more value on that of another. On the contrary, when he
rates individual personality above all other ends, he respects
it in others. His cult for it makes him suffer from all that
minimizes it even among his fellows. A broader sympathy for
human suffering succeeds the fanatical devotions of primitive
times.l14

By way of comparison, it may be noted here that Gilligan
acknowledges the "right to include oneself in the compass of a
morality of responsibility" and the need to give moral weight
both to "the sense of concern for another human being and your
sense of concern for yourself."115 Accordingly, the ultimate
task of a morality of responsibility, or an ethic of care, is to
resolve the conflict of responsibilities to care for oneself and
other persons. GiUigan believes that human moral maturity
consists in carrying out this task.'l6
But Durkheim looks at a deeper truth: only by keeping our
sense of the worth of our individual existence can we maintain
our sense of concern for others. The belief in individual rights
by which we can refuse to abandon ourselves to "the fanatical
devotions" to collective goals is the real basis for "a broader
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DURKHEIM,
supra note 46, at 240.
GILUGAN, supra note 14, at 134.
Id at 151-74.

550

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW WVIEW [I993

sympathy for human s~f'fering."~~'
This is another sense in
which an ethic of care presupposes an ethic of rights.

In summary, communitarians urge that the liberal belief in
individual rights impoverishes our communal life and human
agency. But the Japanese experience presented in this article
shows that this is at most a half-truth and only applicable to a
misguided version of rights talk. The closed community that
neglects individual rights and absorbs its members' personality
117. This view seems to complement the conception of liberal community that
Ronald Dworkin recently presented in his Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV.479,
499-504 (1989).The liberal community, in his view, consists of "liberal civic republicans" or "integrated citizens." Each "accepts that the value of his own life depends on the success of his community in treating everyone with equal concern."
Id. at 501. Therefore, an individual's value depends on whether the rights of other
citizens as well as his own are duly protected. They "know that they win or lose
together." Id. at 502. Dworkin concedes that this liberal vision of community is
utopian, but in the following statements he gives a reason "why people should accept integration in the liberal sense, why they should regard the success of their
lives as dependent . . . on the justice of their community's political decisions." Id.
Someone lives well when he responds appropriately to his circumstances.
The ethical question is not how should human beings live, but how
should someone in my position live? A great deal turns, therefore, on how
my position is to be defined, and it seems compelling that justice should
figure in the description. The ethical question becomes: what is a good
life for someone entitled to the share of resources I am entitled to
have? . . . Someone does pro tanto a poorer job of living-responds pro
tanto more poorly to his circumstances-if he acts unjustly. . . . Perhaps
the great lives of some artists would not have been possible in a fully
just society, and it would not follow that they had bad lives. But it does
follow that it counts against the goodness of any life, even theirs, that it
was supported by injustice.
Id. at 503.
But what if I do not have more nor less than, but just as much as the share
of resources I am entitled to? What if the misery of the people victimized by an
unjust practice prevails because some others' lives, not mine, are supported by that
practice? Does it follow that I would not have to care a bit about their misery? I
do not think Dworkin would say yes. The a f f i i t i v e answer implies that I can be
indifferent to the misery of others as long as I am not involved in the injustice
which brings it about-as long as my own hands are clean. This does not fit
Dworkin's conception of the community of integrated liberals. But his argument
given above does not seem to prevent u s from accepting this conclusion. So it
seems to me that "a broader sympathy for human suffering," to which our sense of
the worth of individual personality commits us, gives a simpler and stronger
ground for his vision of a liberal community. It is true that the range of liberal
integration in question is narrower than this sympathy-it is confined to the political community (the state). But this could be explained by the fact that our ability
to make common political decisions is still basically limited to the territory of our
state in the present world order.
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also impoverishes our communal life, as well a s our individuality. Adequately conceived individual rights based on universalism, a non-absolutist trump function and a sense of the worth
of individuality are the bases for a richer form of communality-namely,
open communality. This form of communality
activates and widens our sensitivity to the wide range of our
communal responsibilities. In other words, individual rights
can sustain the delicate equilibrium of various competing communities by checking the overgrowth of each of them. In this
sense, the tension between rights and community is indispensable to their reconciliation.

